Influences of Human Cognition and Visual Behavior on Password Strength during Picture Password Composition by Katsini, Christina et al.
 Influences of Human Cognition and Visual Behavior on 
Password Strength during Picture Password Composition 
Christina Katsini1,2, Christos Fidas3, George E. Raptis1,2, Marios Belk4,5, George Samaras5,  
Nikolaos Avouris2 
1Human Opsis, Patras, Greece, 2HCI Group, University of Patras, Greece, 3Department of Cultural 
Heritage Management and New Technologies, University of Patras, Greece, 4Cognitive UX GmbH,  
Heidelberg, Germany, 5Department of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus 
katsinic@upnet.gr, fidas@upatras.gr, raptisg@upnet.gr, belk@cognitiveux.de,  
cssamara@cs.ucy.ac.cy, avouris@upatras.gr 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Visual attention, search, processing and comprehension are 
important cognitive tasks during a graphical password com-
position activity. Aiming to shed light on whether individual 
differences on visual behavior affect the strength of the cre-
ated passwords, we conducted an eye-tracking study (N=36) 
and adopted an accredited cognitive style theory to interpret 
the results. The analysis revealed that users with different 
cognitive styles followed different patterns of visual behav-
ior which affected the strength of the created passwords. Mo-
tivated, by the results of the first study, we introduced adap-
tive characteristics to the user authentication mechanism, 
aiming to assist specific cognitive style user groups to create 
more secure passwords, and conducted a second study with 
a new sample (N=40) to test the adaptive characteristics. Re-
sults strengthen our assumptions that adaptive mechanisms 
based on users’ differences in cognitive and visual behavior 
uncover a new perspective for improving the password’s 
strength within graphical user authentication realms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Graphical User Authentication (GUA) schemes are con-
stantly gaining market share as they scaffold natural human-
computer interaction and adapt easier to nowadays mobile 
and immersive user interaction realms [11,20,64]. Examples 
of commercially deployed GUA schemes are the Android 
Pattern Unlock and the Windows 8TM Picture Gesture Au-
thentication (PGA). GUA schemes lie under two main cate-
gories: recognition-based and recall-based. 
In recognition-based schemes, the users memorize a set of 
images during registration which they must distinguish 
among a set of decoy images during login.  Examples of such 
mechanisms are Passfaces [9], Dejavu [17] and VIP [2]. De-
spite that recognition-based passwords seem easy to remem-
ber; their drawback lies in that a large image pool is required 
in order to achieve a sufficiently high entropy [25].  
In recall-based schemes, the users are required to memorize 
and reproduce a graphical password. A notable example of 
such scheme is DAS [27], where the users draw a shape on a 
grid. These schemes are quick and convenient to use, but us-
ers often make mistakes in remembering the order and the 
precise location, when redrawing their secret [23,27]. Cues 
were introduced to help users reproduce their passwords 
more accurately, without them having a direct role in the 
password. Most often, images play the role of the cue.  
PassPoints [60], Cued Click Points (CCP) [14], and PGA are 
examples of such schemes. In PassPoints the users are re-
quired to select five points on a provided image. To log-in, 
they must repeat the sequence of the points in the correct or-
der within a system-defined tolerance. In CCP, the users are 
presented with a number of images in sequence and are re-
quired to select a point on each image. To log-in, each image 
is displayed after selecting the correct point at the previous 
one. In PGA, the users are required to draw three gestures on 
an image they selected. To log-in, they must reproduce the 
three gestures within a system-defined tolerance. 
Despite the research efforts in the GUA field, studies have 
revealed that people make predictable choices when using 
graphical passwords [40,49,55], introducing vulnerabilities 
to systems and services. Since password composition and 
login in GUA encompass visual information processing and 
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 considering that socio-cognitive theories have been used to 
explain users’ behavior in visual tasks [18,46,61], they could 
be used to shed light on how people make their password 
choices. A cognitive theory interrelated with the visual be-
havior is the Field Dependence-Independence (FD-I) theory 
[61], which suggests that individuals have different ap-
proaches in retrieving, recalling, processing, and storing 
graphical information. FD-I theory characterizes individuals 
as either field dependent (FD) or field independent (FI). FDs 
tend to follow a more holistic approach to process visual in-
formation and have difficulties in identifying details in com-
plex visual scenes [61], while FIs tend to follow a more ana-
lytical approach to process visual information, pay attention 
to details, and easily separate simple structures from the sur-
rounding visual context [61]. 
Considering that the strength of the chosen password is de-
termined during password composition, in this paper we 
adopt an FD-I perspective and investigate how users react to 
stimuli, through analyzing their visual behavior, aiming to 
understand how they decide on the graphical passwords they 
create. This will allow us to draw conclusions on the effects 
of cognitive styles on the strength of the created passwords, 
understand whether and how this is associated with the users’ 
visual behavior, and investigate whether this knowledge 
could be used to design adaptive mechanisms that could en-
able users to make stronger passwords.  
Based on our motivation, we report two contributions. First, 
we provide an exploratory study to identify whether there are 
effects of cognitive styles on the strength of the user-created 
recall-based passwords and whether these are correlated to 
the users’ visual behavior during password creation. Second, 
we introduce a new feature to the GUA scheme based on the 
results revealed in the first study and report on the compari-
son of the strength of the created passwords of the two stud-
ies.  
RELATED WORK 
Several studies have investigated the effects of user choices 
on the strength of the created graphical passwords. User 
choices can be affected by human factors, such as gender and 
cultural background [36], technological factors, such as de-
vice type [11], GUA scheme characteristics, such as grid size 
[8,34], design space [50], etc.  
Two crucial parameters that influence the strength of the 
password are the gesture(s) drawn and the background im-
age(s) used. Regarding gestures, Alt et al. [1] showed that 
most passwords consist of two or three strokes, with top-to-
bottom or left-to-right direction being the two most common. 
Similar findings were revealed by Zhao et al. [67], who 
showed that taps and lines are the most popular gestures. Re-
garding image type and context, research has revealed that 
the users prefer images showing people [1,67], scenery [1], 
and comic [1], while coherent images fit better as graphical 
images compared to jumbled ones [4]. In addition, people’s 
choices are affected by the human characteristic of facial im-
ages such as race, age, and gender [16], and the colors and 
the category of images [37]. Images have attention points 
where people draw gestures [1,18,55,66,67], which can be 
revealed through saliency and proximity filters [59]. These 
have been used effectively for offline password attacks [55], 
revealing that people’s choices are related to the image’s sa-
liency points. Therefore, image complexity (i.e., number of 
attention points in an image) [12,21,59], and tolerance or ac-
curacy rate [11,59] affect password strength and memorabil-
ity (the less complex the image, the more predictable the cre-
ated password is; the more the tolerance, the more easy for 
attackers to guess the created password). Several attempts to 
identify attention points of images through eye-tracking have 
been made, and eye-tracking has been used to increase the 
strength of the graphical passwords [10,34]. 
From a human cognitive perspective, Belk et al. investigated 
the effects of cognitive processing styles [6], and abilities [7] 
towards users’ login performance and memorability of tex-
tual and graphical passwords. Their research revealed that 
the FI users outperformed the FD users during login in terms 
of time. Users with enhanced working memory and pro-
cessing speed outperformed users with limited processing 
abilities during login tasks. In Katsini et al. [29] work, a pre-
liminary analysis revealed that FD users created less strong 
passwords compared to FI users when using a recognition-
based GUA scheme.  
Regarding elementary cognitive processes, Chiasson et al. 
[13] reported that people could remember more easily graph-
ical over text-based passwords, a finding that was also sup-
ported by Meng et al. [35]. Everitt et al. [22] found that peo-
ple who accessed four different infrequent graphical pass-
words each week had greater failure rates than those access-
ing a single infrequent password. Stobert and Biddle [52] 
showed that cued-recall was better than free-recall and that 
recognition-based graphical passwords were more memora-
ble than recall-based passwords. Huestegge and Pimenidis 
[26] found increased login times when memory load in-
creased and longer retention intervals yielded an increase of 
search times and login failures when using a face-based 
GUA scheme.  
Based on the related work, we infer that from a human cog-
nition perspective: (a) existing research focuses rather on the 
login task per se, and not on the password composition; and 
(b) there is no research work which investigates whether us-
ers’ individual cognitive characteristics are reflected in their 
visual behavior during graphical password composition, and 
whether they have an impact on security aspects of recall-
based graphical passwords. Given the importance of visual 
information processing in GUAs, we argue that investigating 
the effect of users’ cognitive styles on passwords’ strength 
and visual behavior within graphical password composition 
activities, can provide important insights about the value of 
considering individual cognitive differences as a design fac-
tor, in both design- and run-time, aiming to uncover a new 
perspective for improving the security within graphical user 
authentication realms. 
 EXPLORATORY STUDY 
We designed a controlled experiment in which the partici-
pants were asked to use a web-based picture passwords 
mechanism similar to PGA. In PGA, the users select their 
own image as their password background image cue; thus, 
they can use images of varying complexity. Considering that 
image complexity is known to affect both the password 
strength [59] and the gesture combinations [1,40,41,55], we 
intentionally decided to provide two images of different 
complexity (in terms of number of attention points) and ex-
amine whether cognitive and visual behavior differences 
during password composition affect the strength of the cre-
ated passwords. 
Hypotheses 
We formed the following null hypotheses: 
H01. There is no significant difference on the strength of the 
created graphical passwords between field-dependent (FD) 
and field-independent (FI) individuals across background 
images of varying complexity; 
H02. There is no correlation between the strength of the cre-
ated graphical passwords and the visual behavior of field-de-
pendent (FD) and field-independent (FI) individuals across 
background images of varying complexity. 
Participants 
A total of 36 individuals (16 females) participated in the 
study. Their age ranged between 22 and 38 years (m = 31.7; 
sd = 6.1). Thirteen participants were undergraduate students; 
nineteen participants were postgraduate students; four partic-
ipants were professionals. Participants did not have any vi-
sion problems or wore glasses. The recruitment took place 
by communicating the research via posting flyers on bulletin 
boards at various places on campus, and directly contacting 
acquaintances of the research team. To increase internal va-
lidity of the study, we recruited participants that had no prior 
experience and had never heard of PGA. 
Study Instruments 
Recall-based Graphical Authentication Mechanism 
We used a web-based picture passwords mechanism, shown 
in Figure 1,which resembles the workflow and appearance of 
PGA [28]. This is a cued-recall graphical authentication 
scheme, used for creating gesture-based passwords using a 
background image as a cue. There are three types of permit-
ted gestures: taps, lines and circles. Free line gestures, are 
converted to one of the three recognized gestures. To store 
the gestures the mechanism creates a grid on the image by 
dividing the longest dimension of the image into 100 seg-
ments and then dividing the shortest dimension by the same 
scale. The gestures are then stored based on their position on 
the grid, with their coordinates corresponding to segments 
rather than to pixels. The following information is stored for 
each type of gesture: for taps the coordinates of a point, for 
lines the coordinates of the starting and the ending point, and 
for circles the coordinates of the center, the radius and the 
direction.  
 
Figure 1: The recall-based GUA scheme used in our study re-
sembled Windows 8TM Picture Gesture Authentication. The us-
ers could create their password by making three of the follow-
ing types of gestures: taps, lines, and circles. 
During enrolment, the screen is divided in two parts as 
shown in Figure 1. On the left, instructions for creating a 
password are provided. In addition, there are three numbers 
(1, 2 and 3) which provide feedback on the currently active 
gesture (the corresponding number is highlighted). At the 
bottom, there is a “Start again” button, which allows the user 
to restart the enrolment, and a “Confirm password” button, 
which is activated once all three gestures have been recorded. 
The background image, on which the user creates the pass-
word, by drawing three gestures, is located on the right side 
of the screen. On releasing each gesture, the shape of the ges-
ture is displayed temporarily on the corresponding location, 
to inform the user that the gesture has been recorded. To con-
firm the gestures and create the graphical password the users 
must reproduce the three gestures. The comparison of the 
two passwords shows some tolerance in terms of coordinates 
(36 segments around the selected segment are accepted). No 
tolerance is shown in type, ordering and directionality of the 
gestures. If any of these does not match, then the password 
will not be created.  
During login, the user is provided with the same screen. The 
image is loaded and the number 1 is highlighted. The mech-
anism allows the user to reproduce all three gestures and then 
compares the reproduced password with the stored one. 
Login succeeds if a) the gestures (type, ordering, and direc-
tionality) match with the stored ones and b) the distance be-
tween the reproduced and the stored gestures is within the 
tolerance interval. 
To control image complexity, we calculated the saliency map 
and the entropy of several images, and we decided to use the 
following two: a simple image which consists of a main at-
tention point and shows a flying jet (entropy =.453) and a 
complex image which consists of several attention points and 
shows a workplace (entropy = .983). The images are repre-
sentative of the two most popular image categories, based on 
research which revealed that people tend to select images 
which show people [1,21] and images which show a scenery 
and/or a single object [21,66] as background images for pass-
words. Both the images we selected and their saliency maps, 
as produced by the saliency filters provided by [42], are de-
picted in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2: Images of different complexity used in the study, a 
simple image showing a jet (left), and a complex image showing 
a workplace (right). At the bottom, the saliency maps of the im-
ages are depicted. 
Cognitive Style Classification Test 
To classify the participants as either FD or FI we used the 
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) [39], which is the 
original classification FD-I tool. GEFT is a credible and val-
idated time-administered “paper and pencil” instrument [31], 
which measures the ability of an individual to identify a sim-
ple figure within a complex background. Individuals are 
asked to identify and outline a given simple pattern in a vis-
ually complex context within a given amount of time. The 
test is divided in three sections. The first section is used for 
practice. The correct answers of the next two sections are 
summed to provide a raw score, ranging between 0 and 18. 
Individuals are classified as FD or FI by using a cut-off score.  
In our study, the participants’ scores were normally distrib-
uted and ranged between 3 and 18 (m=11.27, sd=3.51, 
p=.085). Our sample’s mean GEFT score is comparable to 
the national mean of 11.4 in Witkin et al. [39]. The cut-off 
score was determined to be 12, as it has been widely used in 
the literature [3,24,45], meaning that the participants who 
scored from 0 to 11 were classified as FD, and those who 
scored from 12 to 18 as FI. 17 participants were classified as 
FD, and 19 as FI. 
Equipment 
The study was conducted using a Samsung Galaxy Tab S2 
tablet computer with a 9.7" monitor at a screen resolution of 
2048x1536 pixels (i.e., 4:3). To capture the eye movements, 
we used the Tobii Pro Glasses 2, which captures data at 
50Hz. Fixations were extracted using a customized velocity 
threshold identification (I-VT) algorithm [32], based on the 
I-VT algorithm provided by Tobii. 
Metrics 
Password Strength Metric 
To measure the created graphical passwords’ strength, we 
adopted password guessability, a widely used metric for 
measuring password strength [66,67]. We used a brute-force 
approach based on the attention points of each background 
image, as discussed in [48,66]. Our brute-force algorithm 
started from the segments covering the attention points, next 
checked the neighboring segments, and finally checked the 
rest of the image segments. The password strength was meas-
ured in number of guesses required to crack each password.  
Visual Behavior Metrics 
Our visual behavior metrics are: fixation duration, number of 
fixations, number of fixated segments and fixation distance, 
as they are related to FD-I cognitive style and visual decision 
making tasks [45]. Fixations are one of the basic eye-move-
ments [19], and they occur while individuals’ eyes are kept 
aligned with the target for a certain duration, allowing for the 
visual scene details to be processed. The fixation duration 
metric is the total duration of fixations of an individual 
within an area of interest (AOI), considering visits and revis-
its to the AOI. The number of fixations metric is the total 
number of fixations of an individual within each AOI, con-
sidering visits and revisits to the AOI. The number of fixated 
segments metric is the total number of unique fixations on 
each segment of the GUA scheme without considering revis-
its. In our study, each segment of the image is an AOI. The 
fixation distance metric is the Euclidean distance between 
two fixation points mapped on the background image.  
Procedure 
Each participant visited our lab at a previously agreed date 
and time. The study was conducted in a quiet room in our 
lab. The procedure involved the following steps: first, the 
participant was introduced to the task and familiarized with 
the eye-tracking equipment. Participants wearing glasses 
wore the eye-tracking glasses on top of their glasses. The 
eye-tracking calibration process, as described in [56], fol-
lowed. Next, the participants were asked to use the tablet and 
create their graphical password, by creating a username in 
the first step and then by drawing three gestures using their 
hand, which they had to reproduce to confirm the created 
password. As discussed earlier, users were provided with two 
images of different complexity. After creating the first pass-
word, the facilitator changed the background image and 
asked the participant to refresh the web-page and follow the 
same process to create a second password. To avoid order 
effects, we counterbalanced the sequence of the background 
images; thus, 18 participants used the simple image first, 
while the other 18 participants used the complex image first. 
After creating the password, the participants were distracted 
for about 20 minutes with completing the GEFT test. Next, 
they were asked to use the login details they had created for 
both images to log-in and answer a short questionnaire on 
demographics. We included this step to ensure users did not 
create the passwords randomly. Finally, an informal discus-
sion on how the participants created their graphical pass-
words took place. Prior to the study, the participants were 
informed that the collected data during the session would be 
stored anonymously and would be used only for research 
purposes by the research group, and they provided their con-
sent. To avoid bias effects, no details regarding the research 
objective were provided to the study participants. 
 Results 
To investigate H01, we ran a mixed ANOVA test, with the 
FD-I cognitive style (FD or FI) and the image complexity 
(simple or complex) as the independent variables, and the 
number of guesses needed to crack the password as the de-
pendent variable. The test met all the mixed ANOVA as-
sumptions. The analysis revealed a significant interaction be-
tween the effects of the FD-I cognitive style and the image 
complexity on the strength of the created passwords, F = 
4.183, p = .041, η2 = .166. Pairwise comparisons, with p-val-
ues Bonferroni-adjusted and 95% confidence intervals, re-
vealed that 120 thousand fewer guesses were required to 
crack the passwords of the FIs when using the simple back-
ground image compared to the FDs when using the simple 
background image (p = .042). For the FDs, no significant dif-
ferences were revealed between the passwords created using 
the two images. For the FIs, 138 thousand more guesses were 
required to crack the passwords created using the complex 
background image compared to those created using the sim-
ple background image (p = .028).  
 
Figure 3: The impact of the cognitive style on the password 
strength is affected by the complexity of the background image. 
FIs created stronger passwords when using a complex back-
ground image, while FDs created stronger passwords when us-
ing a simple background image. 
To assess the relationship between the security of the created 
passwords and the visual behavior (H02) we ran a Pearson 
correlation test. Preliminary analyses showed that the rela-
tionship is linear with both variables being normally distrib-
uted, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), and there 
were no outliers. The analysis revealed a strong correlation 
between the strength of the created passwords (in terms of 
number of guesses needed to crack) and the number of fix-
ated segments (r = .618, p = .041), and a small correlation 
between the passwords’ strength and the fixation duration (r 
= .296, p = .044). To investigate the influence of the FD-I 
cognitive style and the image complexity on the correlation 
between the visual behavior metrics and the password 
strength, we ran a series of partial Pearson correlations. The 
analysis revealed a medium correlation between the number 
of fixated segments and the password strength, when consid-
ering the FD-I cognitive style as a control factor (r = .323, p 
= .043). When considering both the FD-I cognitive style and 
the image complexity as the control factors, a medium 
 Fixated 
segments 
Number of 
fixations 
Fixation 
duration 
Fixation 
distance 
No control factor 
Password 
strength 
r = .618 
p = .041 
r = .235 
p = .116 
r = .296 
p = .044 
r = .239 
p = .109 
Controlling for FD-I cognitive style 
Password 
strength 
r = .323 
p = .043 
r = .207 
p = .173 
r = .268 
p = .075 
r = .214 
p = .157 
Controlling for FD-I cognitive style and image complexity 
Password 
strength 
r = .306 
p = .044 
r = .225 
p = .141 
r = .319 
p = .035 
r = .003 
p = .985 
Table 1: Pearson correlation analysis between the security of 
the graphical passwords and the visual behavior metrics. 
correlation between the passwords’ strength and the number 
of fixated segments (r = .306, p = .044), and between the 
passwords strength and the fixation duration (r = .319, p = 
.035) was revealed. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
To further investigate the visual behavior of the study partic-
ipants and understand whether there is an interaction be-
tween the FD-I cognitive style and the image complexity on 
the visual behavior metrics, we ran a mixed MANOVA test. 
The independent variables were the cognitive style (FD or 
FI) and the image complexity (simple and complex). The de-
pendent variables of the test were the combined visual be-
havior metrics (number of fixations, number of fixated seg-
ments, fixation duration, and fixation distance). Residual 
analysis revealed that all the MANOVA assumptions were 
met (the dependent variables’ data that was not normally dis-
tributed was transformed according to the approach proposed 
by [53]).  
The interaction effect between the FD-I cognitive style and 
the image complexity on the combined visual behavior met-
rics was not statistically significant, F = .408, p = .632, Wilks' 
Λ = .956, partial η2 = .144. However, there was a statistically 
significant main effect on the combined visual behavior met-
rics for the FD-I cognitive style (F = 2.158, p = .048, Wilks' 
Λ = .801, partial η2 = .397), and the image complexity (F = 
3.828, p = .021, Wilks' Λ = .603, partial η2 = .460). Regard-
ing the main effects of FD-I cognitive style on the visual be-
havior metrics, there was a statistically significant main ef-
fect for the number of fixated segments (F = 5.358, p = .031, 
partial η2 = .203), the number of fixations (F = 5.859, p = 
.025, partial η2 = .218), fixation duration (F = 4.694, p = .042, 
partial η2 = .183), but not for fixation distance (F = 2.149, p 
= .158, partial η2 = .093). All p-values are Bonferroni-ad-
justed. FDs produced 22.085 (95% CI, -.384 to 44.553, p = 
.041) more fixations than FIs on the simple background im-
age. FDs fixated for 11.442 (95% CI, 3.559 to 17.194, p = 
.037) more seconds on the simple background image than the 
FIs. FDs fixated on 26.910 (95% CI, -1.725 to 55.545, p = 
.043) more segments in the simple background image than 
FIs. No main effects of the image complexity for any of the 
visual behavior metrics were revealed.  
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Figure 4: (a) Gaze plots of a typical FD (left) and a typical FI (right) participant for the simple (top) and the complex (bottom) 
background image. (b) Fixation scatter plots of FDs (left) and FIs (right) for the simple (top) and the complex (bottom) image.
Interpretation of Results 
FDs created stronger passwords than FIs when using the sim-
ple background image. Observing their visual behavior al-
lowed us to draw conclusions about their approach during 
password composition. Despite that the saliency points of the 
image drew FDs’ attention, they created their passwords not 
directly on the saliency points, but instead they used them as 
a reference for creating their passwords. They followed a ho-
listic search approach, as shown in the gaze plot of a typical 
FD in Figure 4. They did not pay attention to details (e.g., 
wings, turbines), but used their creative thinking to draw 
their passwords, aiming to make them less predictable.  
“The airplane is the center of the picture, so that’s where 
all the others draw their passwords. I avoided drawing 
on it, but I drew my password around it” ~ P02 
“I split the image in the middle and created a graphical 
password around the jet, having the airframe as my start-
ing point. I believe I created a symmetrical password, 
which I can easily remember” ~ P14 
We should note that none of the participants was aware of 
how the password strength is measured, but the FDs inher-
ently assumed that it is related to the saliency point because, 
as they said, most people would draw their gestures on the 
airplane. On the other hand, FIs selected passwords follow-
ing image shapes. The airplane drew their attention, as 
shown in the gaze plot of a typical FI in Figure 4, and they 
focused on identifying the shapes that could possibly be used 
to form their password. Their choices were based on extract-
ing simple shapes. Circling the airplane, drawing lines on the 
wings, and taping the turbines are typical examples of pass-
words created by the FIs.  
“I think I created a strong password, since I focused on 
the almost hidden details of the wings” ~ P08 
“I drew short gestures forming some of the letters of the 
brand, which was visible at the airframe” ~ P19 
On complex image, FIs created stronger passwords than FDs. 
FDs scanned the complex image around the saliency points 
and they focused on hands and gestures which reflected the 
interaction among the people. Given that FDs are more at-
tentive to social cues than FIs [62], this could reflect their 
inherent need to communicate. Examples of gestures used by 
FDs are connecting lines between faces or lines following the 
gaze of the people in the image.  
“I used lines to connect the gaze of two people” ~ P11 
“I tried to create a more complex password by drawing 
lines that cross the image and connect people” ~ P20 
On the other hand, FI individuals scanned the image starting 
by the faces. Then, their attention shifted to shapes and ob-
jects which, again, they used to accurately draw gestures. 
Circling objects, or creating lines on objects were common 
gestures used by the FIs. 
“I like books, so I circled the book and then I noticed a 
pen, so I drew a line on the pen” ~ P01 
“I used certain characteristics of the people to create my 
passwords, e.g. eyes” ~ P09 
Finally, FIs created stronger passwords when using the com-
plex image compared to when using the simple one. Given 
that the complex image included more saliency points, they 
were able to scan the image and use their analytical skills to 
detect simple shapes, which they used to draw their gestures. 
The saliency points of the simple image were limited; thus, 
they could not exploit their skills and draw unique gestures. 
Their abilities were confined by the poor, in terms of visual 
content, image. To conclude, results of the first study re-
vealed that both the cognitive style and the complexity of the 
image affected the visual behavior of the participants. This is 
evident in the gaze and the scatter plots of Figure 4, which 
reveal that in both images FDs followed a more holistic vis-
ual exploration approach, while the FIs focused on shapes.   
(a) (b) 
  
Figure 5:  The image is totally covered at the beginning, and then the successive saliency levels based on the eye-tracking data of each 
cognitive group fade-out within 20 seconds.  
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
Considering the correlation between the visual behavior and 
the strength of the created passwords revealed in the explor-
atory study, we used the eye-tracking data of the FD and the 
FI individuals to create an assistive GUA mechanism based 
on saliency mask. Then, we conducted a user study to inves-
tigate the effects of this mechanism on the strength of the 
created passwords, and compare the mechanism with the in-
itial one, from a cognitive and image complexity perspective. 
Hypothesis 
H03. There is no significant difference on the strength of the 
passwords created with and without the saliency masks of 
FD and FI individuals across background images of varying 
complexity. 
Participants 
Following the recruitment process described in the explora-
tory study, we recruited 40 individuals (17 females) for the 
second study. Their age ranged between 18 and 37 years (m 
= 32.1; sd = 5.8). 11 participants were undergraduate stu-
dents; 15 participants were postgraduate students; 14 partic-
ipants were professionals. Participants did not have any vi-
sion problems or wore glasses. The participants had no ex-
perience with and had never heard of cued-recall GUA 
schemes (e.g., PGA). Based on the users’ GEFT scores, 22 
participants were classified as FD, and 18 participants as FI 
(mean score = 12.15; sd = 5.68; min = 1; max = 18; cut-off 
score = 12). The scores of the participants were normally dis-
tributed according to the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p=.102). 
Study Instruments 
We used the same instruments as the ones described in the 
exploratory study. We added the saliency mask feature in the 
web-based picture passwords mechanism. Instead of using 
computational methods to create the saliency mask, such as 
in [10], we used the visual behavior of the FD and the FI 
users of our first study (i.e. the segments that each group fix-
ated). Thus, we created one saliency mask based on the vis-
ual behavior of the FDs and one based on the visual behavior 
of the FIs, for each image. Instead of completely hiding the 
saliency points of the images, we were inspired by the “draw-
ing the curtain” used by Thorpe et al. [54] where the image 
is first covered with a curtain (i.e. white foreground) and then 
the curtain is drawn from either right-to-left or left-to-right, 
gradually revealing the image beneath, and used a gaussian 
distribution algorithm to create saliency layers. Then, we cre-
ated a fade-out effect starting from the highest saliency mask 
level (total black foreground) and ending to showing the im-
age without any saliency mask applied. Following common 
practice [54], 20 seconds were required in total to display the 
image without any saliency mask. In Figure 5, we show 
screenshots of the saliency layers for the timestamps 0, 5, 10, 
15, and 20 seconds. We added a start button, which the users 
had to click when ready to view the image. We used this ap-
proach to ensure that the user would focus on the image and 
would gain full advantage of the saliency mask mechanism. 
We used the GEFT test to elicit the cognitive style of the par-
ticipants and the same tablet device and eye-tracking equip-
ment as in the first study.  
FD 
FI 
FD 
FI 
simple 
complex 
 Procedure 
The procedure we followed in the comparative study is sim-
ilar to the procedure of the exploratory study. Each partici-
pant visited our lab at a previously agreed date and time. The 
study was conducted in a quiet room in our lab. The proce-
dure involved the following steps: first, the participants un-
dertook GEFT; their score was calculated, and they were 
classified either as FD or FI. Based on the classified cogni-
tive style group, the facilitator adjusted the cognitive-de-
pendent saliency-mask mechanism accordingly for the par-
ticipant. Next, the participants wore the eye-tracking glasses 
and the calibration process [56] followed. Then, the users 
created a graphical password using a tablet device, on the two 
background images of varying complexity used in the ex-
ploratory study, along with the corresponding saliency mask 
for each one. After creating the first password, the facilitator 
changed the background image and asked the participant to 
refresh the web-page and follow the same process to create a 
second password. To avoid order effects, we counterbal-
anced the sequence of the background images. After creating 
the password, the participants were distracted for about 20 
minutes with an activity similar to GEFT. Next, they used 
the created passwords for both images to log-in and answer 
a short questionnaire on demographics. Finally, an informal 
discussion on how the users created their graphical password 
took place. Prior to the study, participants were informed that 
the collected data during the session would be stored anony-
mously and would be used only for research purposes by the 
research group, and they provided their consent. No details 
regarding the research objective were provided. 
Results 
To investigate H03, we performed a mixed ANOVA, with 
the FD-I cognitive style (FD or FI), the image complexity 
(simple or complex), and the saliency mechanism (no-sali-
ency or with-saliency) as the independent variables and the 
number of guesses needed to crack the password as the de-
pendent variable. The test met all the assumptions (the data 
that was not normally distributed was transformed according 
to the approach proposed by [53]). The analysis revealed that 
there was no statistically significant three-way interaction 
between the password strength, the cognitive style, and the 
saliency mechanism, F = 1.419, p = .239, η2 = .028. Focusing 
on the effect of the saliency mask mechanism, the analysis 
revealed that the individuals who created their graphical 
passwords using the saliency mask mechanism created 
stronger passwords than the individuals who used the origi-
nal mechanism, F = 12.342, p = .002, η2 = .198, accepted at 
a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha-level of .025. Focusing on the 
cognitive style, both FDs and FIs who used the saliency mask 
drawn stronger passwords on the complex background image 
than the FDs and FIs who used the original tool (FD: F = 
7.204, p = .010, η2 = .126; FI: F = 3.596, p = .023; η2 = .098). 
Significant differences were also revealed for the passwords 
drawn on the simple background image by FIs (F = 3.794, p 
= .021; η2 = .101), but not for FDs. The results are depicted 
in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Saliency-mask mechanism helped both FD and FI in-
dividuals to create stronger passwords when having simple or 
complex background images (CI error bars are displayed). 
Interpretation of Results 
Regarding the simple image, the FDs were not affected by 
our mechanism, as their passwords were already strong. Sim-
ilarly, to the case of the simple image of the exploratory 
study, they used the saliency points as reference points for 
drawing their gestures. On the other hand, FIs created 
stronger passwords compared to those created by the FIs in 
the exploratory study. Compared to the exploratory study, 
FIs extended the active drawing area of their gestures and 
used more combinations (e.g., they created passwords in-
cluding all three gestures more often). As a result, they cre-
ated stronger passwords than the passwords created by FIs 
when the saliency mask mechanism was not active (explora-
tory study). Despite that the strength of the passwords cre-
ated by the FIs increased, they were still less strong when 
compared to those created by the FDs, as FIs focused again 
on the main parts of the airplane (i.e. primary point of inter-
est), such as the airframe and the wings.  
Regarding the complex image, both FDs and FIs created 
stronger passwords compared to those of the complex image 
of the exploratory study. FDs faced difficulties with pro-
cessing visual complex scenes, and our mechanism allowed 
them to process more visual information because it was dis-
played gradually to them within 20 seconds. Hence, they had 
more time to conceptualize the context of the image and spot 
simple objects (e.g., notebook, pot), which they used to draw 
their gestures on. Likewise, our saliency mask mechanism 
helped FIs to identify various objects in the scene (e.g., pot 
on the self, ceiling lights), which were not among the primary 
attention points. Due to their skill to conceptualize details 
fast, they used such items to form their graphical password.  
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 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results of the exploratory study suggest that human cog-
nitive factors and image complexity affect the graphical 
passwords’ strength when using a recall-based GUA scheme. 
FD and FI individuals have unique characteristics that influ-
ence the approach they follow to create a graphical password, 
which is reflected on their visual behavior. The results of the 
comparative study suggest that personalized assistive mech-
anisms, bootstrapped on the unique cognitive characteristics 
of the users, can be used to improve the strength of the drawn 
passwords. Simple mechanisms, such as saliency masks, can 
draw FDs’ and FIs’ attention to image areas which are less 
likely to be used based on their visual behavior patterns, and 
thus help them create less predictable passwords. The find-
ings of both studies are summarized in Table 2. 
 No-saliency mask mechanism 
Password 
Strength 
FDs created stronger passwords than FIs when us-
ing a simple background image. FIs who used a 
complex background image created stronger pass-
words than FIs who used a simple background im-
age to draw their gestures. 
Visual 
Behavior 
The more image segments a user fixated on, and the 
longer fixations he/she had, the stronger password 
he/she created. FDs produced more and longer fix-
ations, fixated on more image segments, and had 
greater fixation distances than FIs  
 Saliency mask mechanism 
Password 
Strength 
The passwords created when the saliency mask was 
active were stronger than the passwords created 
with the original scheme. Both FDs and FIs created 
stronger passwords when using the saliency mask 
mechanism, than the original GUA mechanism. 
Table 2: Summarized findings regarding password security and 
users’ visual behavior. 
The contribution of the paper entails two important aspects; 
theory and application. Regarding theory, our exploratory 
study provides evidence that the individual cognitive charac-
teristics influence users’ choices when creating graphical 
passwords which are related to their visual behavior. Socio-
cognitive theories, like FD-I, can be considered as applicable 
analysis frameworks in understanding and interpreting users’ 
interactions and approaches in visual decision-making tasks, 
such as graphical password composition. 
Regarding application, the analysis and discussion of results 
underpinned the value of considering cognitive styles as a 
human design factor and image complexity as a technology 
factor, in both design and run time, to avoid providing GUAs 
that unintentionally compromise the strength of the password 
created by people who share common cognitive characteris-
tics. For example, FIs created less strong passwords than 
FDs when using a low complexity image. Considering that 
cognitive styles rarely change through lifespan [58], and that 
image complexity can be assessed through saliency filters 
[42], studies like the reported ones could drive the design of 
personalized GUAs that adapt to individual cognitive styles. 
Simple mechanisms (e.g., saliency masks) can be elaborated 
to help users of different cognitive styles improve their pass-
word’s strength when using images of varying complexity. 
Therefore, there is a need to transform the interdependencies 
between human and GUA design factors into formal repre-
sentations modeling users’ individual characteristics, and ac-
cordingly provide adaptive and personalized GUA schemes. 
Based on the Belk’s et al. model [5], we propose a human 
factor-based formalization framework (Figure 7), which con-
ceptually consists of two main modules; the user modeling 
module that is responsible for eliciting and storing the user’s 
overall context of use during interaction (human and tech-
nology specific), and the adaptation module that is responsi-
ble to map human factors with GUA design factors aiming 
to deliver the most optimized GUA scheme to each user.  
 
Figure 7: Conceptual design of an extensible framework spe-
cialized in delivering personalized GUA schemes  
The main results of this study could be transformed into spe-
cific context-based recommendation rules, and be further ap-
plied in a procedure for recommending a specific GUA 
scheme and image complexity by considering the users’ cog-
nitive processing styles. Similarly with structure-based adap-
tive policies [51], cognitive-based adaptive policies could be 
considered for helping users who share common cognitive 
characteristics to create stronger graphical passwords. These 
would automatically evolve over time by taking advantage 
of the common behavioral patterns of the FDs and the FIs. 
For example, when several FDs have used specific points of 
images or gestures to create their password or have viewed 
specific areas of the images, future FDs would not be allowed 
to use them to create their passwords. 
 A challenging part of our proposed framework is the elicita-
tion of human cognition and image complexity factors. Im-
ages can be either provided by the GUA scheme or the user 
can select them. Images selected by the users can be assessed 
by automatic processes, such as saliency detectors [42,65], 
entropy estimators [63], and content-based image retrieval 
techniques [57], to evaluate their complexity. The dataset 
provided by the GUA scheme could also be assessed by hu-
mans to provide a more natural identification of the attention 
points, for example, by using eye-tracking. 
For the elicitation of human cognitive factors in run-time, the 
method proposed by Raptis et al. [44] could be used, as it is 
based on an eye-tracking multifactorial model. To evaluate 
the efficiency of our eye-tracking data, we performed a pre-
liminary small-scale classification experiment following this 
method aiming to provide proof of concept results. We fol-
lowed a 10-fold classification approach, mainly due to our 
small sample size for both background image complexity 
levels, and tested several classifiers towards the percentage 
of the correctly classified instances, using Weka software 
[20]. Logistic Regression classifier worked best for both sim-
ple and complex images, as it classified correctly 75% and 
70% of the users respectively. Considering that FD-I cogni-
tive style can be inferred in the early stages of the graphical 
password composition task [30] and that we move towards 
immersive technologies (e.g., virtual or mixed reality) which 
are based on natural interactions where visual search and ex-
ploration are primary processes, it is important to stress out 
that inferring human cognitive styles while performing a 
GUA authentication task in run-time is realistic. 
LIMITATIONS 
While we took great efforts to maintain our studies’ validity, 
some design aspects of our experimental in-lab studies and 
the designed assistive feature for the GUA scheme introduce 
limitations. First, in our study we selected two specific back-
ground images, a simple and a complex to control the factors 
of the study and compare the user selection and visual be-
havior metrics. There is evidence that the context of the im-
age may affect the user choice [59], nonetheless we have se-
lected two representative images of the most widely used im-
age categories (images including people [1,21] and images 
including a scenery and a single object [21,66]). Expanding 
our research to use more images would increase the validity 
of our study. Given that we conducted a controlled in-lab 
eye-tracking study the user behavior may have been influ-
enced, although no such comment was received from the par-
ticipants. Moreover, the sample size was rather small, but the 
performed statistical tests met all the required assumptions.  
The classification of study participants as either FD or FI, 
was based on the GEFT score, and considering that the GEFT 
test highlights cognitive differences along a continuum scale, 
the use of a cut-off score may not classify correctly individ-
uals that fall in between the two end points [15,33]. However, 
it is important to stress that the frequencies of users’ GEFT 
scores in our sample are similar to general public GEFT 
scores [31,38,43,47]. The eye-tracking data we used to create 
our saliency masks was based on a relatively small dataset. 
Considering, though, that the visual behavior is associated 
with the cognitive style [45], we are confident that the de-
rived saliency masks did not affect the efficiency of the as-
sistive GUA scheme.  
Finally, the approach used to crack the created passwords 
could not be applied to PGA, given that it only allows for 5 
wrong password guesses before a character-based password 
is required. In addition, the guessing algorithm we used was 
very simple, but the aim of our study was not to create and 
test another cracking algorithm, but instead use this as a valid 
approach for measuring and comparing the strength of a 
given set of passwords. Despite the limitations, we expect 
that similar effects will be replicated in the contexts of dif-
ferent GUA schemes, contributing to the study’s external va-
lidity. Similar findings, on FDs’ and FIs’ visual behavior, are 
expected to be found in studies which embrace eye-tracking 
analysis on visual decision-making tasks. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first reported the results of an eye-tracking 
study aiming to investigate the effects of FD-I cognitive style 
on the created passwords’ strength using a cued recall GUA 
scheme and explain the results considering the visual behav-
ior. Significant differences were revealed between the cre-
ated passwords’ strength of FDs and FIs, and on the visual 
behavior of FDs and FIs which were strongly correlated with 
the passwords’ strength. Hence, this paper provides evidence 
that users with different cognitive style follow different strat-
egies when creating graphical passwords on images of vary-
ing complexity and their visual behavior suggests whether 
their choices will lead to strong passwords.  
Triggered by the results of the first study, we designed an 
assistive mechanism based on the visual behavior of the FDs 
and the FIs, which we used as saliency mask on the same 
background images, and conducted a comparative study. Re-
sults reveal that the approach we suggested improved the cre-
ated passwords’ strength, reinforcing our assumption that 
adaptive mechanisms based on the cognitive styles, can pro-
vide a feasible solution for creating stronger passwords. 
Therefore, this work provides evidence that the cognitive 
styles of the users can be used to provide personalized expe-
riences. The results of our study are summarized in Table 2. 
We are encouraged by the results of our work that using cog-
nitive styles for designing personalized assistive features for 
GUA mechanisms is worth further exploration, and we are 
eager to design and evaluate more cognitive style-based fea-
tures to better support the users when creating graphical 
passwords. Apart from password creation, we intend to in-
vestigate the effects of cognitive styles in login, and design 
and test different adaptive policies. Considering the shift to-
wards immersive technologies and the increasing role of the 
eye in such environments, there is room for expanding our 
research in this context.   
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